Robot arms assembling a vehicle body on an automated production line in a large, bright factory hall.

For manufacturing CISOs, OT and product security leads, supply chain and procurement heads, and the boards of automotive, machinery, electronics, medical device and semiconductor companies

Quantum risk in manufacturing

The firmware you sign this year will still be booting machines in 2045.

In fifteen minutes you will know which of your designs, signing keys, recipes and plant configurations are already exposed, what NIS2, the Cyber Resilience Act and the Machinery Regulation let auditors and customers ask about cryptography, and the first 90 days of a plan that fits a plant shutdown calendar.

  • Your exposure, plant by plant and product line by product line
  • The evidence a NIS2 auditor, a CRA market surveillance authority or an OEM customer can ask for
  • A 90-day plan that respects maintenance windows
  • The right training for each role
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Technicians in white protective suits and masks working at benches in a clean laboratory.
Commissioned once. In production for twenty years.

Step 1 of 5

Know which of your designs, keys and plant data are already exposed

A production line commissioned in 2026 will still be running in 2046. The PLCs on it authenticate with certificates built on RSA or ECDSA, the same algorithms that protect your CAD archive, your supplier EDI links and the key that signs every firmware image you ship. A cryptographically relevant quantum computer breaks all of them. The attacker does not need one yet: recorded remote-maintenance sessions, PLM transfers and update traffic can be read later. In manufacturing the product, the plant and the IP all outlive the algorithm.

Manufacturing records and keys that must stay confidential or trustworthy beyond the post-quantum deadlines
Record or key typeHow long it stays sensitiveConfidential until, if created in 2026
Product designs, CAD models, test data and trade secretsLife of the product line and its derivatives, 10 to 25 years2036 to 2051
Firmware signing keys and secure boot roots in shipped productsLife of the installed base, 10 to 25 years2036 to 2051
Recipes, process parameters and alarm set pointsLife of the process, often 15 years or more2041+
PLC programs, DCS and SCADA configurations, historian dataLife of the line; historians kept 7 to 10 years for traceability2033 to 2046
Supplier contracts, pricing and bills of materialsContract term plus renegotiation cycles, 5 to 10 years2031 to 2036
Medical device technical documentation (MDR Article 10(8))At least 10 years after the last device is placed on the market, 15 for implantables2036 to 2041, counted from the last unit shipped
Customer, warranty and field service recordsWarranty and product liability periods, up to 10 years2036

Lifetimes are typical for the asset class; check them against your product roadmap, retention schedule and the record-keeping rules of each market you sell into. For the method, see what to protect first when data outlives the algorithm.

Where your exposure sits, and what you will know

A wall-mounted control cabinet with cable trays, meters, junction boxes and bundles of wiring.

The plant: PLC, DCS, SCADA and historians

OPC UA secures the cell with X.509 certificates on RSA-2048 or ECDSA P-256. PROFINET and Modbus/TCP carry no cryptography at all, so the protection sits in the TLS and VPN tunnels around them. Many Purdue Level 0 to 2 devices cannot take new firmware without a stop, and a stop costs money by the minute.

You will know which cells and lines carry a quantum-vulnerable handshake, which historian, MES and SCADA servers can take hybrid TLS now, and which controllers must wait for a planned shutdown or replacement.

A CNC milling cutter close to a metal surface during machining.

The product: firmware signing, secure boot, device identity and OTA

Every unit you ship trusts a signing key and a boot root. An ML-DSA-65 signature is around 3.3 KB against 64 bytes for ECDSA, and a root of trust burned into silicon cannot be changed in the field. Products placed on the EU market from 11 December 2027 must meet the Cyber Resilience Act's essential requirements for their declared support period.

You will know which product families can change signature algorithm by update, which need a new hardware root at the next revision, and what the CRA technical file has to say about cryptography.

A forklift loading pallets inside a trailer backed up to a warehouse loading dock.

The supply chain: supplier access, EDI, PLM and remote maintenance

Tier 1 and Tier 2 suppliers hold your drawings in their PLM, exchange orders over EDI and AS2, and dial into your machines through vendor VPNs. One slow supplier, or one machine builder with no PQC plan, sets the pace for the whole line.

You will know which suppliers hold keys and designs on your behalf, which remote-access paths to migrate first, and what to write into the next sourcing contract and the next machine specification.

Free readiness check

Score your plant and product security in two minutes

Eight questions mapped to what a NIS2 auditor, a CRA market surveillance authority, an OEM customer and your board can ask about cryptography. You get a score, your top three priorities and the next step that closes your biggest gap. Nothing is sent anywhere.

Start the check
1Do you have a cryptographic inventory that covers the plant floor, the products you ship and the enterprise systems that connect them?

NIS2 lists the use of cryptography among the ten measures every entity must address, and the CRA asks for a technical file per product. You cannot document keys you have not listed.

2Do you know which controllers, drives and edge gateways can accept new cryptography by firmware update, and which cannot?

ML-KEM and ML-DSA keys and signatures are far larger than their RSA and ECC equivalents. Flash, RAM and cycle-time budgets decide whether migration is a software release, a retrofit or a replacement.

3Have you mapped which designs, recipes and records must stay confidential beyond 2030 against the algorithms protecting them today?

Design data and process know-how recorded in transit now can be read once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer exists. A 25-year product line is well inside that window.

4Can your products change signature algorithm in the field, with a dual-signature period, without a hardware change?

Secure boot roots fixed in silicon and bootloaders with no room for a second signature are the most expensive problems to find after the product has shipped.

5Have your machine builders, component suppliers and automation vendors given you a dated post-quantum roadmap?

PLC firmware, OPC UA stacks, drives and safety controllers are bought in. Their timeline is your timeline, and most vendors have not been asked.

6Is there a named owner and a budget line for post-quantum migration that spans OT, product security and IT?

In manufacturing the work falls between plant engineering, product development, IT and procurement. Without an owner it belongs to nobody and misses the next capital cycle.

7Has your board or management body been briefed on quantum risk in the last 12 months?

NIS2 Article 20 makes management bodies approve and oversee cyber security measures and follow training. Manufacturers of medical devices, electronics, machinery and vehicles are in scope as important entities.

8Does every new machine specification and sourcing contract require crypto-agility and a post-quantum roadmap from the vendor?

Equipment bought in 2026 will still be on the floor in 2046. Each algorithm-fixed device you accept now is a replacement you will pay for twice.

Step 2 of 5

Know what NIS2, the Cyber Resilience Act, the Machinery Regulation and your customers will expect, and when

  1. 2024

    Standards and rules

    NIST publishes FIPS 203, 204 and 205 in August. Member States had to transpose NIS2, which lists manufacturing among its critical sectors, by 17 October. The Cyber Resilience Act enters into force on 10 December.

  2. 2026

    CRA reporting and EU first steps

    Manufacturers must report actively exploited vulnerabilities under the CRA from 11 September. The EU roadmap asks every Member State to have a national PQC roadmap and first transition steps in place by the end of the year. NIST IR 8547 is final in October.

  3. 2027

    Machinery Regulation and CRA in full

    The Machinery Regulation applies on a mandatory basis from 20 January, with its provisions for safety control systems and compliance-relevant software. From 11 December, products with digital elements placed on the EU market must meet the CRA's essential requirements.

  4. 2028

    UK discovery done

    The NCSC expects defined migration goals, a full discovery exercise and an initial plan, including the requirement to migrate long-lived hardware roots of trust.

  5. 2030

    High-risk migrated

    EU target for high-risk use cases, including critical infrastructure. NIST deprecates 112-bit RSA and ECC. CNSA 2.0 requires post-quantum software and firmware signing only, which reaches defence suppliers.

  6. 2035

    RSA and ECC disallowed

    NIST disallows them. The EU roadmap and the NCSC timeline end here. A line commissioned in 2026 is nine years into a twenty-year life, and the products it built are still in the field.

Key facts for manufacturing, checked 30 October 2026

  • The Commission Recommendation of 11 April 2024 (C(2024) 2393) asks every Member State to adopt a national post-quantum strategy and to deploy post-quantum cryptography, hybrid where needed, across public administration systems and critical infrastructure. European Commission
  • The EU Coordinated Implementation Roadmap, published through the NIS Cooperation Group on 23 June 2025, asks Member States to start the transition and have national roadmaps in place by the end of 2026, to migrate high-risk use cases by the end of 2030 and as many systems as feasible by the end of 2035. European Commission
  • Securing Tomorrow, Today, the joint statement of cyber security agencies from EU Member States first issued in November 2024 and re-issued with further signatories in July 2025, treats the quantum threat as part of cyber security risk management now and calls for hybrid post-quantum deployment. BSI
  • NIS2 lists the manufacturing of medical devices, computers and electronics, machinery and equipment, motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers and other transport equipment among its other critical sectors, and requires every entity in scope to address ten measures including supply chain security and the use of cryptography. Member States had until 17 October 2024 to transpose it. European Commission
  • The Cyber Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, entered into force on 10 December 2024. Reporting obligations for actively exploited vulnerabilities apply from 11 September 2026 and the main obligations, including the essential cybersecurity requirements for hardware and software products with digital elements, from 11 December 2027. European Commission
  • The Machinery Regulation (EU) 2023/1230, adopted on 14 June 2023, applies on a mandatory basis from 20 January 2027 and integrates provisions for cyber-safety for compliance-relevant software, data and safety control systems. Machinery placed on the market before that date must comply with the Machinery Directive. European Commission
  • IEC 62443-3-3:2013 sets system security requirements and security levels for industrial automation and control systems, used with zones and conduits, and IEC 62443-4-2:2019 sets the technical security requirements for the components inside them. Neither names post-quantum algorithms yet. IEC
  • The UK NCSC timeline of 20 March 2025 asks organisations to complete discovery and an initial plan by 2028, including the requirement to migrate any long-lived hardware roots of trust, to finish the highest-priority migrations by 2031 and to complete migration by 2035. It singles out OT and extensive physical infrastructure for their slow replacement cycles. UK NCSC
  • The UK consumer connectable product security regime under the PSTI Act came into effect on 29 April 2024. Manufacturers, importers and distributors must ship products without universal default passwords, publish how to report vulnerabilities and state the minimum period for which security updates will be provided. UK Government
  • CISA's Critical Manufacturing Sector covers primary metals, machinery, electrical equipment, appliance and component, and transportation equipment manufacturing, because products made by these industries are essential to many other critical infrastructure sectors. CISA
  • NIST SP 800-82 Revision 3, Guide to Operational Technology Security, published in September 2023, covers industrial control systems including SCADA, DCS and PLCs and recommends countermeasures that account for the performance, reliability and safety requirements of OT. NIST
  • The CMMC programme rule (32 CFR Part 170) took effect on 16 December 2024 and the DFARS acquisition rule on 10 November 2025, phasing CMMC into DoD contracts from that date, which reaches manufacturers in the defence industrial base. Federal Register
  • The final NIST IR 8547, published 27 October 2026, deprecates quantum-vulnerable public-key cryptography after 2030 and disallows it after 2035. NIST
A close-up of a white industrial robot arm with a green light ring and a red end tool.

The evidence you will be able to show

NIS2 Article 21

A cryptography policy backed by an inventory

You show: A documented policy on the use of cryptography and encryption, and the inventory behind it, covering plant, product and enterprise systems, with quantum-vulnerable algorithms flagged.

Cyber Resilience Act

Products that can change algorithm during their support period

You show: A technical file per product family that records the signing and boot cryptography in use, the declared support period and the dated path to post-quantum signatures.

IEC 62443 and the Machinery Regulation

Zones and conduits with a migration sequence

You show: A zone and conduit model of each plant with the cryptographic dependencies of every conduit, the devices that are algorithm-fixed and the shutdown windows that will be used to change them.

EU roadmap and NCSC timeline

A named lead and dated milestones

You show: A PQC migration lead, a plan with the EU end-2026 and 2030 milestones and the NCSC 2028 and 2031 milestones, and roadmaps on file from each machine builder and critical supplier.

Technicians in white protective suits and masks working at benches in a clean laboratory.

UK manufacturers. The NCSC timeline sets the pace: discovery and a plan by 2028, including long-lived hardware roots of trust, highest-priority migration by 2031, complete by 2035. Consumer connectable products have been under the PSTI regime since 29 April 2024, and the minimum security update period you publish is also the period for which your signing cryptography must hold. Anything you place on the EU market still falls under the Cyber Resilience Act from 11 December 2027, wherever it is made. Read the NCSC position explained.

Automotive and transport equipment suppliers

Type-approved vehicles sit under UNECE R155 and R156 rather than the CRA, but the production equipment that builds them, the aftermarket devices and the telematics units do fall under the CRA, and the OEM will flow its own post-quantum requirements down through the Tier 1 contract. Expect the questionnaire before the 2027 dates. See the automotive and transport page.

Medical device manufacturers

Medical device manufacturing is an important-entity sector under NIS2, the MDR asks you to keep technical documentation for at least ten years after the last device ships, and connected devices carry a signing key for the life of the fleet in a hospital. The CRA excludes devices already covered by the MDR, so the cryptography evidence sits in your MDR technical file instead. See the healthcare page.

Semiconductors: the Chips Acts and the root of trust

The EU Chips Act, Regulation (EU) 2023/1781, has applied since 21 September 2023, with a Chips Act 2.0 proposed by the Commission in June 2026; the US CHIPS and Science Act put $39 billion into manufacturing incentives and $11 billion into research through NIST. Fabs are OT estates with the most valuable recipes in the sector, and the chips they produce carry the boot roots and secure elements every other manufacturer will depend on into the 2040s. A device without room for ML-DSA verification is a quantum-vulnerable product for its whole life. European Chips Act.

US manufacturers: CISA, SP 800-82 and the defence industrial base

CISA treats critical manufacturing as one of the sixteen critical infrastructure sectors and asks product makers to sign its Secure by Design pledge, whose seven goals include security patches and vulnerability disclosure. NIST SP 800-82 Revision 3 is the OT security baseline. Manufacturers in the defence industrial base are being phased into CMMC from November 2025, and Executive Order 14412 of June 2026 orders a proposed FAR rule requiring contractors to meet PQC-compliant FIPS by 31 December 2030. Read the CMMC readiness analysis.

Step 3 of 5

Build a plan your board can sign off in 90 days

By day 30

It has an owner and a scope

  • A PQC migration lead with authority across plant, product and enterprise cryptography, and a sponsor on the board.
  • Inventory scoped to firmware signing, OPC UA and VPN certificate chains, vendor remote access, PLM and EDI links and the HSMs behind them.
  • Designs, recipes and records mapped to their useful life and to the algorithms protecting them.
By day 60

You have the evidence

  • OT protocol scan run on one plant and the results placed in a zone and conduit model.
  • A post-quantum questionnaire with every machine builder, automation vendor and critical supplier.
  • Product families classified by whether they can change signature algorithm by update, by retrofit or not at all.
By day 90

Your board has a plan to approve

  • Plants, product lines and suppliers ranked by data lifetime, exposure and the 2027 and 2030 dates.
  • A dual-signed firmware release or hybrid TLS on one historian piloted, with what broke written down.
  • A roadmap with 2027, 2028, 2030 and 2035 milestones, tied to the shutdown calendar and the capital plan.
Who will deliver it? See step 4 →

The five numbers to show your board

  1. Inventory coverageThe share of plants, product families and enterprise systems with a completed cryptographic inventory.
  2. Exposed IPThe designs, recipes and records that must stay confidential beyond 2030 and still move or rest behind RSA or ECC.
  3. Algorithm-fixed devicesHow many controllers, drives and shipped product families cannot change cryptography without a hardware change, and what replacing them costs.
  4. Supplier readinessHow many machine builders, automation vendors and critical suppliers have a dated post-quantum roadmap on file.
  5. Plan statusBudget committed and milestones met against the 2027 CRA date, the 2030 EU target and the 2035 deadline.

How to phase the spend, 2026 to 2035

  1. 2026Discover, scan and change procurementOwner, plant-wide inventory, OT protocol scan, device classification and the vendor questionnaire, in line with the EU first-steps milestone. No algorithm-fixed machine enters the estate without a documented agility requirement.
  2. 2027Products, contracts and the IT-OT boundaryCrypto-agile signing and boot architecture specified for every product that falls under the CRA from December, PQC clauses in sourcing contracts and machine specifications, hybrid TLS on firewalls, jump servers, historians and MES at the IT-OT boundary.
  3. 2028 to 2030Signing roots, supplier links and cell networksFirmware signing moved to ML-DSA or hash-based signatures with a dual-signature period, PLM, EDI and remote-maintenance links on hybrid key exchange, OPC UA certificate profiles upgraded where the stack allows, to meet the EU 2030 target and NIST deprecation.
  4. 2031 to 2035Replace the rest at planned shutdownsAlgorithm-fixed PLCs, drives and safety controllers replaced within scheduled line upgrades and capital programmes, and the last product revisions with classical boot roots retired, before RSA and ECC are disallowed in 2035.

Dates from the EU roadmap, the Cyber Resilience Act and NIST IR 8547. For the supplier side, see the Quantum-Safe Supply Chain Security for Manufacturers workshop; for budget ranges, our PQC migration cost benchmarks.

Free tools to do it this quarter

Need help delivering the plan? Our expert members are peer-reviewed suppliers, integrators and advisers. Meet the expert members →

Step 4 of 5

Equip the people who will deliver it

A migration succeeds or stalls on people. Match each role to the outcome you need from them.

For your programme lead

Your programme lead can run the migration across plant, product and supply chain

  • Inventory and CBOM auditing for OT, shipped products and enterprise systems
  • Risk prioritisation by data lifetime, device life and the 2027 and 2030 dates
  • Crypto-agile architecture and GRC integration for NIS2, CRA and IEC 62443 evidence
  • Supplier management and a tabletop exercise with your plant scenario

CPQCPM, Certified Post Quantum Cryptography Programme Manager. Ten hours live online over five weeks, small cohorts, delivered by Chris Basener of Argus Advisory and certified by QSECDEF. See the full course →

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Board and executives

Your board can challenge the plan, understand why product and line life changes the maths, and approve a multi-year budget with confidence.

Certified Quantum Business Professional

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OT security leads, plant engineers and IT/OT integration teams

Your engineers know where the asymmetric cryptography sits in OPC UA, PROFINET, MQTT and the IIoT edge, which devices can take ML-KEM and ML-DSA, and how to sequence the work across the Purdue model without stopping production.

PQC Migration for Industrial Control Systems

Half day, 3 hours, in person or online. ICS exposure assessment, protocol-specific analysis, FIPS 203, 204 and 205 selection for constrained devices, and Purdue-model migration sequencing.

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Security, risk and IT teams

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Introduction to Quantum Cyber Security

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Training plant, product and procurement teams together? Put everyone on one plan.

Team membership brings your board, programme lead, OT engineers and security teams up to speed together, tracks what each person has completed and certifies across the group. The courses above are included, plus 170+ expert lectures and the weekly call, and members pay less for CPQCPM.

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Step 5 of 5

Compare notes with peers running the same plants and product lines

A members-only roundtable for manufacturing CEOs, COOs, CISOs and the heads of OT, product security and supply chain. It runs under the Chatham House Rule and is facilitated by Anna Beata Kalisz Hedegaard, Founder of QSECDEF.

  • An honest read on where manufacturing peers have reached with PQC across ICS, SCADA and enterprise IT, and which parts of the plant are proving hardest to move
  • How peers handle the shutdown constraint: cryptographic upgrades in environments where a restart is a production event with a cost
  • Which supplier dependencies carry the most PQC risk, and the contractual and technical options peers have used
  • A calibrated view of quantum optimisation for scheduling, supply chain and quality control: what works today and what is still vendor aspiration
  • How to present quantum risk and quantum opportunity to a board that understands production efficiency and has not yet connected either to quantum
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Briefings on what is changing
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Lectures from people doing this work

Practitioner lectures from the QSECDEF library that matter most to manufacturers: securing plant networks with PQC, crypto-agility at scale, continuous testing, entropy and QRNGs in the supply chain, SBOM and CBOM, cryptographic inventory, quantum device fabrication and quantum optimisation.

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Global Quantum Intelligence
HYPATIA Smart Technologies
SAS
Triarii Research
Airbus Central R&T
Aireon
Airesatech
Ait
Appliedquantum
Arise Innovations
Arobs
Arqit
Asc Csa
Atlant3D
Bank of Ireland
Barak Azar
Basener Consulting
BHO Legal
Bitcoinqs
Bloq
Buckingham
CloudTech Group
Coherent Computing
Creotech
Cryptalabs
CyberProtonics
Cysec
Cystel
Deimos Space
Department of Digitalization
Dhbw
Dlr
Eclypses
Elpromaelectronics
Engineering
Enluzstrategy
Entrokey Labs
Eptalent
ESA
Esa
Euc
EXATEL
Finqbit
Fraunhofer
Georgetown
GQI
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Ibm
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Jagiellonian University
Jos Quantum
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Kit
Krown Technologies
Kwantumg
Lightriderinc
Linkedin
Lnu
Mbda Systems
Meetiqm
Merqury
Metrosert
Molket
Nicolaus Copernicus University in Torun
Nokia
Orcacomputing
Osi
Pantherun
Patero
Photonics Foundry
Q Ctrl
Qryptocyber
Qssys
Qticompany
Qtlabs
Quandela
Quant X Sec
Quant.Bond
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Quantum Computing Inc
Quantum Dice
Quantumbrilliance
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Qustream
Reddixgroup
Slater Technologies
Smartcyber Group
Smoad
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Swiss Financial Innovation Desk
Technology Innovation Institute (TII)
Thequantuminsider
Tobias Heindel
Tu Braunschweig
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Welinq
Wizzwang
Xairos
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QIZ
Global Quantum Intelligence
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SAS
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Our analysis and programmes for manufacturing

Policy and mandates

Questions leaders ask

Does NIS2 apply to manufacturers?

Yes, for most of the sector. Annex II lists the manufacture of medical devices and in vitro diagnostics, computer, electronic and optical products, electrical equipment, machinery and equipment, motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers, and other transport equipment among the other critical sectors, which makes medium and large manufacturers in those lines important entities. Article 21 then requires ten measures, including supply chain security and policies on the use of cryptography and, where appropriate, encryption, and Article 20 makes the management body approve and oversee them. Member States had until 17 October 2024 to transpose the directive, so the obligations now sit in national law.

What does the Cyber Resilience Act require of a product, and when?

The CRA, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, applies to hardware and software products with digital elements placed on the EU market, wherever they are made. It entered into force on 10 December 2024. From 11 September 2026 manufacturers must report actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents. From 11 December 2027 products must meet the essential cybersecurity requirements in Annex I, which include protecting the confidentiality of data with mechanisms appropriate to the state of the art, such as encryption, and must receive security updates for a declared support period. A product whose signing or boot cryptography cannot change during that support period is a design problem the technical file will expose.

What does the Machinery Regulation add in 2027?

Regulation (EU) 2023/1230 replaces the Machinery Directive and applies on a mandatory basis from 20 January 2027. Alongside the familiar essential health and safety requirements it integrates provisions for cyber-safety: compliance-relevant software and data, and safety control systems, must be protected against corruption, including malicious attempts. Machinery placed on the market before 20 January 2027 still follows the Directive. For a machine builder the practical consequence is that the integrity of the safety software, and the signing cryptography that proves it, becomes part of the conformity assessment.

Does IEC 62443 say anything about post-quantum cryptography?

Not yet. IEC 62443-3-3:2013 sets system requirements and security levels and IEC 62443-4-2:2019 sets component requirements, and both are written in terms of capabilities rather than named algorithms. The Commission Recommendation of April 2024 asks standards bodies to integrate PQC into their work, and we have found no published IEC 62443 post-quantum work item. Use the series for what it does well: the zones and conduits model gives you the structure to sequence the migration plant by plant, and the security level targets tell you which conduits to move first.

Why is firmware signing the first thing to fix?

Because it is the trust anchor for everything else and it lives longest. Every unit you ship verifies updates against a public key, often fixed in a secure element or boot ROM at the factory. Once an attacker can forge an ECDSA or RSA signature, every device still trusting that key accepts their firmware. The fix is a dual-signature period, classical plus ML-DSA or a hash-based signature, with the post-quantum root provisioned at manufacture. Secure boot roots that cannot be changed in the field need a hardware revision, which is why product families shipping in 2027 should carry a post-quantum root even if the first firmware does not use it.

Can a PLC or a drive on the plant floor run post-quantum cryptography?

Some can, many cannot. ML-KEM-768 has a 1,184-byte public key and ML-DSA-65 signatures run to about 3.3 KB, which matters on devices with kilobytes of RAM, deterministic cycle times and firmware that only changes at a planned shutdown. The realistic approach is Purdue-model sequencing: enterprise and DMZ systems first, then historians, MES and SCADA servers with hybrid TLS, then OPC UA certificate profiles where the stack supports them, and a deferral strategy for Level 0 to 2 devices until vendor firmware or replacement arrives. The ICS course works through each layer.

How exposed is the manufacturing supply chain?

More than the plant, usually. Suppliers hold your drawings in their PLM, exchange orders over EDI and AS2 links with RSA key exchange, and reach your machines through vendor VPNs. Any of that traffic recorded now is readable later, and a forged signature on a supplier's component firmware arrives inside your product. NIS2 Article 21 puts supply chain security on your list of measures, and the OEMs will flow their own requirements down. Start with the Third-Party Cryptographic Exposure Model and a questionnaire to every machine builder and automation vendor.

What about semiconductor manufacturers specifically?

Two exposures at once. The fab is an OT estate whose recipes and mask data are the most valuable process IP in any sector, protected by the same remote-maintenance tunnels and PLM transfers as everyone else's. The chips are the roots of trust that every other manufacturer will ship for the next twenty years, so room for ML-DSA verification and ML-KEM key establishment in silicon is a decision taken now. The EU Chips Act has applied since September 2023 with a Chips Act 2.0 proposed in June 2026, and the US CHIPS and Science Act put $39 billion into manufacturing incentives, which brings security expectations with the money.

Where should a manufacturer start?

With a cryptographic inventory that spans plant, product and enterprise; a map of which designs, recipes and records must stay confidential beyond 2030; a classification of devices and product families by whether they can change algorithm by update, retrofit or not at all; and roadmaps requested from every machine builder, automation vendor and critical supplier. Those four give the board the evidence to set priorities and fit the work to the shutdown calendar.

What does QSECDEF offer manufacturers for free?

Everything on this page. The two-minute readiness check scores your plant and product security programme and routes you to the right next step. The free tools, including the OT Protocol Quantum Vulnerability Scanner and the OT Cryptographic Asset Prioritisation Matrix, run in your browser with no registration. The weekly peer call runs every Tuesday at 15:00 CET and is open to anyone. Sample lectures from the 170-plus expert library are linked above, and the page is reviewed as the mandates change; the date beside the key facts is the last check.

Which QSECDEF course should a manufacturing team take first?

It depends on the role. Boards and executives start with the Certified Quantum Business Professional bootcamp, about 22 hours self-paced across ten modules. Security, risk and IT teams take Introduction to Quantum Cyber Security, four to five hours online with a QSECDEF certificate. OT security leads, plant engineers and IT/OT integration teams take PQC Migration for Industrial Control Systems, the sector course for SCADA, DCS and ICS environments, and procurement and supplier security teams take Quantum-Safe Supply Chain Security for Manufacturers. Whoever will run the migration takes CPQCPM, the Certified Post Quantum Cryptography Programme Manager course: ten hours live online over five weeks, with the next public cohort in January 2027.

Can QSECDEF run private training or a workshop for our plant, product team or group?

Yes. QSECDEF runs private CPQCPM cohorts for a single organisation, live online or in person, and private deliveries of the sector courses listed under Equip your people for your OT, product security and supply chain teams. Board and leadership workshops are built on your own exposure and obligations and end with an agreed position on quantum risk. Use the contact button in the For your organisation section and tell us your timeline.

How do we find vetted suppliers or consultants for a manufacturing PQC migration?

Through the QSECDEF Expert Members directory. Every listed member has been vetted, has signed the Members' Charter and has presented to the community. You can filter by consulting and services, technology vendor or enablement and investment, and send a request for further information from the member's own page. QSECDEF is vendor-neutral and sells training, not migration products, so the shortlist stays yours.

Is QSECDEF membership relevant to a manufacturer?

Two routes. QSECDEF membership gives your team the self-paced courses, the full lecture archive, the weekly call and 25 per cent off CPQCPM and partner training. Expert Membership is for the builders, consultancies and technology vendors serving manufacturing who want to be found by the people reading this page; it includes a showcase listing with an enquiry form, the Industry Conversations and speaking slots at the annual QSECDEF symposium.

Is QSECDEF selling a migration product?

No. QSECDEF is a vendor-neutral membership network. We train people and connect them with peers and peer-reviewed experts; we do not sell migration software or services.

How much time does the training take?

CPQCPM is ten hours of live instruction over five weeks, two hours a week. The Quantum Cyber Security course is 4 to 5 hours, self-paced. The business bootcamp is self-paced at your own speed. The manufacturing courses are listed with their formats on the training pages: the ICS course is a half day of three hours, the supply chain, scheduling and quality control workshops are full days of six hours.

Ask a practitioner, live

The free weekly call runs every Tuesday at 15:00 CET. Bring your question.

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For your organisation

Need it built around your plants, your products or your supply chain?

When your board, your OEM customer or your group security function needs something specific, we shape the workshop, the training or the engagement around your sites, your product roadmap and your shutdown calendar. Independent of any vendor.

Custom workshops

Your leadership leaves with an agreed position on quantum risk and quantum opportunity

In-person sessions for manufacturers drawn from the manufacturing workshop programme: PQC migration for industrial control systems, quantum-safe supply chain security, quantum optimisation for production scheduling, quantum computing for quality control and quantum simulation for materials.

Private training

Your plant, product and procurement teams trained on one plan

Private CPQCPM cohorts, live online or in person for your required delegates, private deliveries of the ICS and supply chain courses, and team membership for the self-paced courses.

Consulting

A migration programme specified and staffed correctly

Cryptographic inventory, OT and product security assessment, PQC migration planning, supplier review and specialist teams sourced from 1,500+ members across 900+ organisations.

Prefer email? Write to info@qsecdef.com and tell us about your timeline.

Photos: Pexels (Hyundai Motor Group, Pavel Danilyuk, ranjeet ., Daniel Smyth, ELEVATE, Freek Wolsink, adel bouzid, Mikhail Nilov) and QSECDEF, converted to black and white or brand duotone.