The two-clock model: exposure accrues on both Q-day and the regulatory timeline.
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| Provider | Type | Conf Rate ($M/yr) | Auth Rate ($M/yr) | Planned Migration | Slip σ | Shelf Life (yr) | Laggard Prob |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Card Network | |||||||
| Messaging | |||||||
| Card Network | |||||||
| Custodian | |||||||
| Custodian | |||||||
| Custodian | |||||||
| Processor | |||||||
| Processor | |||||||
| Processor | |||||||
| PKI / CA | |||||||
| PKI / CA | |||||||
| PKI / CA |
Expected loss per provider (over Q-day distribution). Ranked by total exposure — your migration prioritisation view.
| Rank | Provider | Type | Conf. ($M) | Auth. ($M) | Reg. ($M) | Total ($M) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Computing… | ||||||
In Plain English
One day, a quantum computer powerful enough to break today's payment security codes will exist. Nobody knows exactly when. This tool estimates how much money is at risk across a payment ecosystem before everyone is protected.
Two separate dangers
Harvest-Now-Decrypt-Later (HNDL). An attacker can copy encrypted data today and decrypt it after Q-day. Data with a long shelf life — settlement records, identity details — remains at risk for years. Data that expires quickly, like card numbers, becomes safe once it's stale.
Fake signatures. From Q-day until a provider completes migration, its digital signatures are forgeable. This is a forward-accruing risk: it starts at Q-day and accumulates until each provider is protected.
Why diversification fails here
In traditional credit risk, spreading exposure across many counterparties reduces tail risk. Quantum-crypto risk breaks this assumption. One quantum computer breaks every provider's legacy cryptography on the same day. Shared vendors, common certificate authorities, and a single regulatory deadline mean that when providers fall behind, they fall behind together. The "diversification illusion" chart shows exactly how much this assumption overstates safety.
The regulatory clock
Regulatory deadlines (DORA, US EO 14412, NCSC UK) add a third exposure channel. Providers that fail to migrate before the deadline face annual fines proportional to their authentication value at stake. This model runs both clocks — Q-day and regulatory — simultaneously.
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