Quantum risk in government and the public sector

In the US, Executive Order 14412 and OMB M-26-15 require civilian agencies to migrate high value assets and high impact systems to PQC for key establishment by 31 December 2030 and for digital signatures by 31 December 2031, with full migration by 2035 under NSM-10. The UK NCSC sets milestones at 2028, 2031 and 2035. The EU roadmap asks Member States for national plans by the end of 2026, high-risk systems by 2030 and as many systems as feasible by 2035. Canada's ITSM.40.001 mirrors the 2031 and 2035 dates, and Australia's ASD recommends ceasing traditional asymmetric cryptography by the end of 2030.

M-26-15, issued on 24 June 2026, implements Executive Order 14412. Each civilian agency had to submit a PQC migration plan to OMB and the Office of the National Cyber Director within 120 days, integrate PQC into existing governance rather than leaving it to the CIO and CISO alone, prioritise high value assets, high impact systems and any system holding data that stays mission-sensitive in 2030, agree responsibilities with cloud providers, and align the plan to NIST IR 8547. Systems that cannot support PQC or hybrid cryptography must be identified for replacement or decommissioning.

The NCSC guidance of 20 March 2025 sets three milestones. By 2028, complete discovery and assessment and have an initial migration plan that identifies priorities, supplier dependencies and investment. By 2031, complete the highest-priority migration activities and refine the plan. By 2035, complete the migration. The dates are guidance rather than law, but GovAssure assessments against the Cyber Assessment Framework are where a department will be asked about them.

Yes. Annex I of Directive (EU) 2022/2555 lists public administration entities of central government as a high-criticality sector, and Member States may bring regional entities into scope. Article 21(2)(h) requires policies and procedures on the use of cryptography and, where appropriate, encryption. The Directive had to be transposed by 17 October 2024, so the national law in each Member State is the text to read.

An adversary copies encrypted traffic or data today and stores it until a quantum computer can break the encryption. Governments hold the records with the longest confidentiality: classified material declassified at 25 years or later, census returns closed for 100 years, care records kept to a 75th birthday, and biometric identity data that cannot be reissued. State intelligence services also have the patience and the budget to store ciphertext for decades.

Name a migration lead with authority across IT, security and procurement. Build a cryptographic inventory of high value and high impact systems and the services citizens depend on. Map record types to retention and closure periods to find what must stay sensitive past 2030. Then get post-quantum roadmaps from your cloud, shared-service, PKI and identity providers. Those four steps give an accounting officer the evidence to set priorities.

QKD can protect a fixed point-to-point link between two trusted sites, which is why some governments have deployed it for inter-ministry or national backbone links. It does nothing for stored data, digital signatures, identity or the citizen's connection to a service, and it needs its own authentication, which today means PQC. Treat it as a possible addition for a small number of high-value links, not as a substitute for migrating the estate.

Not for the migration itself, but the migration exposes the question. Post-quantum key establishment and signatures on a hyperscale cloud are only as sovereign as the key management, HSMs and identity services behind them, and OMB M-26-15 tells agencies to agree who migrates what with their cloud providers. A department that cannot answer where its keys are generated and held has a sovereignty gap as well as a cryptography gap.

NIST FIPS 203 (ML-KEM) for key establishment and FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA) for signatures, published on 13 August 2024, are the reference in the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and the EU roadmap. NIST IR 8547 sets the deprecation schedule. In the US, national security systems follow CNSA 2.0 instead, and in Europe ETSI quantum-safe specifications sit alongside the NIST standards. Government procurement should name the FIPS numbers, not the algorithm nicknames.

Sector regulators and national cyber authorities set the frame: in the US, Sector Risk Management Agencies under Executive Order 14412 help operators build PQC migration plans and CISA publishes the guidance; in the UK, competent authorities use the NCSC Cyber Assessment Framework. The assessment itself is usually done by the operator's own team or an independent adviser with no product to sell. QSECDEF runs a full-day Critical National Infrastructure Quantum Risk workshop and a members' network of practitioners who have done the work.

A national quantum strategy sets research, industrial and sovereign capability goals. PQC migration is the defensive programme that sits underneath it: it is the part with deadlines, auditors and budgets this year. The EU roadmap now asks every Member State for a national PQC plan by the end of 2026, and Executive Order 14413 ordered an updated US National Quantum Strategy alongside the migration order. The two belong in the same ministerial briefing.

Everything on this page. The two-minute readiness check scores your government and the public sector programme and routes you to the right next step. The free tools, including the HNDL Risk Calculator and the Q-Day Timeline Risk Calculator, run in your browser with no registration. The weekly peer call runs every Tuesday at 15:00 CET and is open to anyone. Sample lectures from the 170-plus expert library are linked above, and the page is reviewed as the mandates change; the date beside the key facts is the last check.

It depends on the role. Permanent secretaries, agency heads and board members start with the Certified Quantum Business Professional bootcamp, about 22 hours self-paced across ten modules. Security, risk and IT teams take Introduction to Quantum Cyber Security, four to five hours online with a QSECDEF certificate. Standards, compliance and procurement leads take Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards Compliance for Government, for standards, compliance and procurement leads. Whoever will run the migration takes CPQCPM, the Certified Post Quantum Cryptography Programme Manager course: ten hours live online over five weeks, with the next public cohort in January 2027.

Yes. QSECDEF runs private CPQCPM cohorts for a single organisation, live online or in person, and private deliveries of the sector courses listed under Equip your people for your standards, compliance and procurement leads. Board and leadership workshops are built on your own exposure and obligations and end with an agreed position on quantum risk. Use the contact button in the For your organisation section and tell us your timeline.

Through the QSECDEF Expert Members directory. Every listed member has been vetted, has signed the Members' Charter and has presented to the community. You can filter by consulting and services, technology vendor or enablement and investment, and send a request for further information from the member's own page. QSECDEF is vendor-neutral and sells training, not migration products, so the shortlist stays yours.

Two routes. QSECDEF membership gives your team the self-paced courses, the full lecture archive, the weekly call and 25 per cent off CPQCPM and partner training. Expert Membership is for the builders, consultancies and technology vendors serving government and the public sector who want to be found by the people reading this page; it includes a showcase listing with an enquiry form, the Industry Conversations and speaking slots at the annual QSECDEF symposium.

No. QSECDEF is a vendor-neutral membership network. We train people and connect them with peers and peer-reviewed experts; we do not sell migration software or services and we are independent of any country's suppliers.

CPQCPM is ten hours of live instruction over five weeks, two hours a week. The Quantum Cyber Security course is 4 to 5 hours, self-paced. The standards compliance workshop for government is a full day of six hours, in person or online. The business bootcamp is self-paced at your own speed.