Quantum risk in energy and utilities

Not by name. NIS2 lists energy in Annex I as a sector of high criticality, and Article 21(2)(h) requires policies and procedures on the use of cryptography and, where appropriate, encryption. That obligation covers the network and information systems behind the essential service, so SCADA and substation communications are in scope. A competent authority can reasonably ask how your cryptography policy treats algorithms that NIST will deprecate in 2030.

Any protocol that uses RSA or ECDSA for key exchange, certificates or authentication: DNP3 Secure Authentication version 5 update keys, IEC 62351 TLS and role-based access certificate profiles for IEC 61850 and IEC 60870-5-104, and OPC UA security modes. Modbus/TCP and plain IEC 104 carry no cryptography at all, which is a different problem. The symmetric parts, such as AES-256 HMAC in DNP3 SAv5, hold up. Our free OT Protocol Quantum Vulnerability Scanner maps this for the protocols you select.

Some can. Benchmarks from the pqm4 project put ML-KEM-768 key generation at roughly 100,000 clock cycles and about 1.5KB of stack on an ARM Cortex-M4, which is within reach of higher-end fielded controllers and out of reach of older ones. The bigger constraint is bandwidth: an ML-KEM-768 exchange adds about 2,272 bytes, roughly two seconds on a 9,600 baud serial link. Classify each device as algorithm-agile, firmware-updatable or algorithm-fixed and plan from there.

Regulation (EU) 2024/1366, published on 24 May 2024, sets a common European approach to cybersecurity for cross-border electricity flows. It establishes risk assessment methodologies, identifies high-impact and critical-impact entities, sets minimum and advanced cybersecurity controls, and covers reporting, monitoring and crisis management, with ENTSO-E and the EU DSO Entity developing the methodologies. Cryptography that will be deprecated in 2030 belongs in your entity-level risk assessment.

Not yet. CIP-005 covers the electronic security perimeter, CIP-010 governs configuration change management, CIP-012 covers communications between control centres and CIP-013 covers supply chain risk. CIP-013 is the practical hook for requiring algorithm agility in new procurement, and CIP-010 is why a cryptographic firmware change on a high-impact BES Cyber System takes months rather than days. Plan each field update as a formal change project.

An adversary records encrypted traffic or copies encrypted data today and stores it until a quantum computer can break the encryption. Grid topology, protection settings, historian data and plant design records stay useful to an attacker for decades, far longer than the time until a cryptographically relevant quantum computer is expected. Recorded remote access sessions and vendor update channels carry the same risk.

Three things: extend the cryptographic inventory into OT, starting with control-centre links and the IT-OT boundary; run a protocol scan and classify every field device by whether it can take a cryptographic update; and write algorithm agility and a post-quantum firmware roadmap into every RTU, IED and relay tender from now on. Those three give your board the evidence to set priorities.

No. Field migration for algorithm-fixed devices should be aligned with your scheduled protection and asset renewal programmes in the 2031 to 2035 window. What matters now is that no new algorithm-fixed device enters the estate, and that the boundary and control-centre layers, which run on standard hardware, migrate first.

Quantum key distribution can protect specific point-to-point links, and some operators are trialling it on fibre between substations. It does not authenticate a firmware image, it does not reach a serial RTU and it does not replace the post-quantum algorithms NIST has standardised. Treat it as a complement on a small number of high-value links, not as the migration plan.

The UK ONR Security Assessment Principles and IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 17-T (Rev. 1) both expect a risk-informed computer security programme that protects sensitive digital assets against the design basis threat. Neither names post-quantum cryptography yet. Reactor protection, safety instrumented systems and plant design documentation stay sensitive for the life of the plant and its decommissioning, which makes them the longest-lived exposure in the sector.

Five numbers: inventory coverage of OT zones and control-centre links, the count of algorithm-fixed field devices and their replacement dates, the records that must stay confidential beyond 2030, how many OT vendors have a post-quantum firmware roadmap on file, and budget and milestones against the 2030 and 2035 deadlines.

Everything on this page. The two-minute readiness check scores your energy and utilities programme and routes you to the right next step. The free tools, including the OT Protocol Quantum Vulnerability Scanner and the OT Cryptographic Asset Prioritisation Matrix, run in your browser with no registration. The weekly peer call runs every Tuesday at 15:00 CET and is open to anyone. Sample lectures from the 170-plus expert library are linked above, and the page is reviewed as the mandates change; the date beside the key facts is the last check.

It depends on the role. Board and executives start with the Certified Quantum Business Professional bootcamp, about 22 hours self-paced across ten modules. OT security engineers and SCADA architects take Introduction to Quantum Cyber Security, four to five hours online with a QSECDEF certificate. Security, risk and IT teams take Introduction to Quantum Cyber Security, a full day covering DNP3, IEC 61850, Modbus/TCP and OPC UA. Whoever will run the migration takes CPQCPM, the Certified Post Quantum Cryptography Programme Manager course: ten hours live online over five weeks, with the next public cohort in January 2027.

Yes. QSECDEF runs private CPQCPM cohorts for a single organisation, live online or in person, and private deliveries of the sector courses listed under Equip your people for your OT engineers and SCADA architects. Board and leadership workshops are built on your own exposure and obligations and end with an agreed position on quantum risk. Use the contact button in the For your organisation section and tell us your timeline.

Through the QSECDEF Expert Members directory. Every listed member has been vetted, has signed the Members' Charter and has presented to the community. You can filter by consulting and services, technology vendor or enablement and investment, and send a request for further information from the member's own page. QSECDEF is vendor-neutral and sells training, not migration products, so the shortlist stays yours.

Two routes. QSECDEF membership gives your team the self-paced courses, the full lecture archive, the weekly call and 25 per cent off CPQCPM and partner training. Expert Membership is for the builders, consultancies and technology vendors serving energy and utilities who want to be found by the people reading this page; it includes a showcase listing with an enquiry form, the Industry Conversations and speaking slots at the annual QSECDEF symposium.

CPQCPM is ten hours of live instruction over five weeks, two hours a week. PQC Migration for SCADA and OT Networks is a full day of six hours, in person or online. The Quantum Cyber Security course is 4 to 5 hours, self-paced. The business bootcamp is self-paced at your own speed.