China's Quantum Programme: The Security and Economic Questions European Leadership Has Not Finished Answering
China's investment in quantum communications, sensing, and computing is the single most consequential external variable in European quantum security planning. The published data on programme scale, state funding, and academic output is available. What is harder to assess is the implications: for European critical infrastructure security, for quantum technology supply chains, for investment policy, and for the diplomatic frameworks that govern technology cooperation. This conversation is for the senior leaders, in government, defence, and industry, who are making those assessments and need a peer exchange that goes beyond the published summaries.
Event Details
- Who else is in the room
- Senior level executive peers, industry leaders, experts in risk, technology and business. Specifically: senior government officials, defence and intelligence professionals, and industrial leaders with direct responsibility for European security strategy, quantum technology investment, or critical infrastructure protection where China's quantum programme is a strategic variable.
- Access
- Members only. Bundled with Expert Membership. Included with Expert Member tier
- Sponsor
- Organised by QSECDEF
- Facilitator
-
Anna Beata Kalisz Hedegaard Quantum Security Defence - Rules of engagement
- Chatham House Rule Chatham House Rule. Discussion is on the record; attribution is not. Participants may share what was said but not who said it.
- Format
- In-person Hosted Dinner Flexible between roundtable, structured Q&A or in-person hosted dinner
- Who Should Join
- This conversation is for senior government officials, defence and intelligence professionals, and senior industrial leaders who carry direct responsibility for European security strategy, quantum technology investment, or critical infrastructure protection where China's quantum programme is a relevant variable. Academic experts who brief governments on Chinese quantum capability are welcome. It is not for commercial organisations without a direct strategic exposure to Chinese quantum programmes. Participants are expected to bring substantive knowledge of either the technology or the policy dimension, not both.
About This Conversation
Why this matters now
China has invested an estimated $15 billion or more in quantum technology programmes between 2016 and 2025. The Micius satellite demonstrated intercontinental QKD over 7,600 kilometres in 2017, establishing a credible Chinese quantum communications programme nearly a decade ago. Chinese academic output in quantum computing has grown faster than any other national research base over the same period. The economic dimension is less well-understood than the military one: Chinese quantum sensing technology, quantum gravimetry, magnetometry, and atomic clocks, has applications to European critical infrastructure monitoring. Assessing where this represents a genuine capability shift versus where technology is still pre-operational requires a peer exchange that cuts through the gap between the academic literature and secondary attribution.
Outcomes
What you will leave with
- A frank peer assessment of where China's quantum programme poses the most immediate risk to European security planning, and where the public narrative overstates or understates the actual capability
- A shared analysis of the supply chain dimension: where European quantum technology supply chains have dependencies on Chinese components, manufacturing, or academic partnerships that create strategic exposure
- Clarity on the sensing threat specifically: where quantum gravimetry and magnetometry represent a genuine shift in detection capability and where the technology is not yet at operational maturity
- A peer-tested view of the investment policy implications: where European restrictions on Chinese quantum investment are proportionate to the risk and where they are creating capability gaps in the European quantum base
- The diplomatic framing: where the cooperation/competition boundary sits for quantum technology with China, and which cooperation frameworks remain strategically viable
Your Facilitator
Anna Beata Kalisz Hedegaard
Founder, QSECDEF
Anna Beata Kalisz Hedegaard has over 15 years of international experience in deep-tech, telecommunications, and defence communications networks. Her expertise spans intellectual property, advanced communications systems, and quantum secure communications. She has lived and worked across Poland, Denmark, the United States, Malaysia, the Netherlands, and Germany. Anna holds dual Master of Science degrees in Theoretical Cosmology from the University of Southern Denmark and Electrical Engineering from Wright State University, USA. She is the founder and board member of Quantum Security Defence.
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