Workshop Description
A cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) running Shor's algorithm will factor RSA-2048 in hours. Published resource estimates from Gidney and Ekera (2021) project approximately 20 million noisy qubits, with more recent work by Litinski (2023) reducing requirements through improved magic state distillation. For intelligence agencies, the timeline to CRQC determines when stored intercepts become readable and when own communications become vulnerable. Both questions require the same technical understanding.
This workshop covers quantum cryptanalytic algorithms at mathematical depth, examines published resource estimates from peer-reviewed sources, and assesses lattice reduction attacks against the PQC standards (FIPS 203/204) that will replace classical algorithms. Participants work through quantum resource estimation tools to understand what separates current NISQ devices from a CRQC, examine the offensive intelligence implications of quantum codebreaking capability, and evaluate the defensive urgency of migrating SIGINT infrastructure to post-quantum algorithms.
What participants cover
- Shor's algorithm: factoring, discrete logarithm, and elliptic curve variants with resource estimates
- Grover's algorithm: symmetric key search speedup and implications for AES-128 versus AES-256
- Quantum resource estimation: T-gate counts, logical qubits, and error correction overhead for RSA-2048
- Lattice cryptanalysis: BKZ 2.0, sieving, and attacks against ML-KEM (FIPS 203) parameter sets
- Offensive intelligence implications: when stored encrypted intercepts become readable
- Defensive migration: protecting SIGINT infrastructure and intelligence communications with PQC