Workshop Description
Defence organisations maintain hundreds of encrypted tunnels connecting headquarters, field offices, forward operating bases, and allied networks. These tunnels use IPsec with IKEv2 key exchange or TLS-based VPN solutions, all depending on classical public-key cryptography. Replacing the key exchange layer requires either PQC algorithms (ML-KEM for encapsulation, ML-DSA for authentication) or QKD for physics-based key distribution. Each approach has different deployment constraints, and most defence networks will need both.
This workshop provides a detailed technical comparison of QKD-secured tunnelling and PQC-based tunnelling for defence applications. For QKD tunnels, the session covers trusted node relay networks, the EuroQCI initiative, and satellite QKD for long-distance links, alongside the practical constraints of fibre distance limits (approximately 100 km without repeaters), key rate throughput, and equipment cost. For PQC tunnels, it covers ML-KEM integration into IKEv2, hybrid key exchange during transition, and performance impacts on latency-sensitive military traffic. The interactive section compares both approaches against real defence network requirements.
What participants cover
- QKD-secured tunnelling: BB84, CV-QKD, and trusted node architectures for classified point-to-point links
- PQC-based VPN migration: ML-KEM integration into IPsec IKEv2 and TLS 1.3 tunnel configurations
- Hybrid PQC-QKD architectures: combining information-theoretic and computational security guarantees
- Quantum repeater roadmap: entanglement swapping, quantum memories, and extended-range QKD timelines
- Performance analysis: latency, throughput, and key rate impacts on military-grade traffic requirements
- EuroQCI and national quantum network integration for defence tunnel infrastructure