Workshop Description
QKD exploits quantum mechanical properties to distribute encryption keys with security guaranteed by physics rather than computational assumptions. The BB84 protocol with decoy states is the most mature implementation, deployed in metropolitan fibre networks by vendors including ID Quantique and Toshiba. Newer protocols such as CV-QKD eliminate the need for single-photon detectors, while MDI-QKD and twin-field QKD remove entire classes of detector side-channel attacks that have compromised earlier implementations.
For defence organisations, QKD occupies a specific niche. It is appropriate for high-value, short-distance point-to-point links where information-theoretic security justifies the hardware investment: nuclear command and control, embassy-to-capital channels, and SCIF interconnects. It is not a replacement for PQC across general defence IT. Current fibre-based QKD operates reliably to approximately 100 km without quantum repeaters, which remain at least a decade from operational deployment. Satellite QKD extends reach but introduces its own constraints around weather, orbital windows, and ground station security. This session examines both the capabilities and the boundaries.
What participants cover
- BB84 with decoy states, CV-QKD, MDI-QKD, and twin-field QKD protocol mechanics
- Trusted node, MDI mesh, and satellite QKD network architectures (including EuroQCI)
- Distance, throughput, and cost constraints for each QKD approach
- QKD versus PQC decision framework for different defence communication scenarios
- Quantum repeater technology roadmap and realistic deployment timelines
- Vendor landscape and NCSC/BSI procurement guidance for government QKD deployments