Workshop Description
A cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) will break RSA and elliptic curve cryptography using Shor's algorithm. The question is not whether, but when. Current estimates from Gidney and Ekera (2021) project approximately 20 million noisy qubits for RSA-2048 factoring in 8 hours. More recent work by Litinski (2023) reduces this further with improved magic state distillation techniques. For defence organisations, the implications span offensive intelligence collection and defensive infrastructure protection.
This workshop provides a mathematically grounded examination of quantum cryptanalytic algorithms, their resource requirements on real hardware architectures, and the gap between current NISQ devices and fault-tolerant machines needed for codebreaking. Participants work through quantum resource estimation tools to understand T-gate counts, logical qubit requirements, and error correction overhead. The session also examines lattice reduction attacks against PQC candidates (ML-KEM, ML-DSA) and practical side-channel vulnerabilities that exist independently of quantum threats.
What participants cover
- Shor's algorithm mechanics: factoring, discrete logarithm, and elliptic curve variants
- Grover's algorithm: symmetric key search speedup and effective security level reduction
- Quantum resource estimates for RSA-2048, RSA-4096, and AES-256 from peer-reviewed literature
- Lattice cryptanalysis: BKZ 2.0, sieving, and dual/primal attacks against FIPS 203/204 parameters
- HNDL threat modelling for intelligence data with multi-decade classification periods
- Hybrid cryptography deployment strategies under CNSA 2.0 migration timelines